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(The Writ Issues to Stop the Exercise of Jurisdiction Not Possessed.)
(a) No Jurisdiction Because There Has Been No Service of Process.
There are a number of cases, when there was no dispute as to the
facts, where the writ has been issued to stop a court from proceeding as
to a party that had never been served with process, or, could not be
legally served."0 The law seems to be clear that if such is the situation
the writ should issue. In one case a circuit court attempted to order a
corporation, that had never been served, and in fact was not a party to
the suit, to turn over all its assets to a receiver the court had appointed.
The circuit court was stopped from carrying out the order by pro-
hibition.8' And so a circuit court was stopped from proceeding further
in an action on a foreign judgment when the foreign judgment showed
no service upon the alleged judgment debtor. s2 The same result was
reached when the probate court attempted to sell land to pay debts of a
decedent without giving any notice to the heirs:as is required by law.8"
So also a probate court was stopped by prohibition from passing on a
claim against a decedent's estate prior to the return term.8" The writ will
issue to a probate court that attempts to proceed in any insanity proceed-
ing where the service of the notice is void because served by the com-
plainant in the proceeding.85
80.. Houston etc. Ry. Co. v. Caldwell (1910) 231 Mo. 505, 132 S. W. 1067.
81. St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. Wear (1896) 135 Mo. 230, 36 S. W. 357, 658.
82. State ex rel. Bond v. Fisher (1910) 230 Mo. 325, 130 S. W. 35. The issuance
of the writ in this case was not based solely on this ground.
83. State ex rel. Deems v. Holtcamp (1912) 245 Mo. 655, 151 S. W. 153.
84. State ex rel. Harrington v. Pratt (1914) 183 Mo. App. 209, 170 S. W. 418.
85. State ex rel. Finch v. Duncan (1916) 195 Mo. App. 541, 193 S. W. 950.
Trimble, J., writing the opinion, said: "If the so-called notice on which the inquiry
is based is in law no notice, then the error of considering it as notice is not only an
error of law, but one going to the jurisdiction of the probate court to maintain the
inquiry and not a mere irregularity, or defect thereof. In such case prohibition will
lie," See also Burke v. McClure (1922) 211 Mo. App. 446, 245 S. W. 62.
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(b) The Writ Issues Where There Is No Jurisdiction of The Subject
of The Action.
As was stated at the outset of this part of the article, a court in
order to exercise its powers must have jurisdiction of the subject of the
action. If the subject of the action is beyond the jurisdiction of the
particular court it will be stopped from proceeding fur :her by a writ of
prohibition. The writ was issued stopping a circuit court from trying a
suit in equity to cancel an alleged fraudulent deed to lands in Virginia,
the court being of the opinion, (except Lamm, J., and Kennish, J.) that,
though the necessary parties were before the court, a Missouri equity
court had no power to render a decree affecting title to land in another
state.",, Hence, it has been decided that a circuit court will be prevented
by prohibition from trying an equity case to restrain a railroad company
from building an embankment on an abandoned street, conceded to be
in a county outside the jurisdiction of the court, where the statute limited
the jurisdiction of the court, even in an equity case, where title may be
affected, to land within the area composing the circuit.8
So also a circuit court will be stopped by prohibition, when sitting
as a juvenile court, from making orders relating to the custody of children
living in a county not within the circuit.87 The statate conferring the
power over children, proposed to be exercised, limited it to children
either residing in or being in the county where the court sits.A5
A circuit court will be stopped that attempts, in an equity case,
through its receiver, to take possession of a fund of a foreign insurance
corporation when the fund is in another state. 9 Hence, the writ has been
issued to a probate court about to appoint a guardian for a person of
85a. State ex rel. Huntv. Grimm (1912) 243 Mo. 667, 148 ;. W. 868.
86. State ex rel. Gavin v. Muench (1910) 225 Mo. 210, 1243. W. 1124.
87. State ex rel. Emory v. Porterfield (1922) 211 Mo. App. 499, 244 S. W. 966.
Trimble, J., for the court, said: "But the facts are not contesited, and hence lack of
jurisdiction appears on the face of the proceedings in the juvenile court. It is well
settled that the attempted action of a court in excess of or beyond its jurisdiction may
be prohibited. St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. Wear, 135 Mo. 230, 36 S. W. 357, 658, 33 L. R.
A. 341."
88. R. S. Mo. 1919, §2592.
89. State ex rel. Minnesota etc. Co. v. Denton (1910) 229 Mo. 187, 129 S. W. 709.
See also State ex rel. Hartford etc. Co. v. Shain (1912) 245 Mo. 78, 149 S. W. 479.
When a circuit court was stopped from trying an equity case to compel an accounting
against a foreign corporation when its funds, books, etc., were in another state.
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advanced age,ssa where the statute only conferred power to appoint a
guardian for an idiot, lunatic, or person of unsound mind; also where the
probate court was about to appoint a guardian for one who was not the
owner of property,ssb where the court only had such power over persons
of unsound mind owning property.
(c) The Wrong Venue.
The writ will issue when a suit is pending in a court other than the
court which a statute has provided is the proper place to bring the suit.
The circuit court of Ray County was prohibited from entertaining
jurisdiction of a proceeding to extend a drainage district when the
statute provided such an action should be commenced in the county
where the district was incorporated and its articles of incorporation were
filed.9"
(d) Where The Judge of The Court is Disqualified.
Prohibition issues where the judge of the court, for some legal reason,
is disqualified from sitting in the pending case, and, though disqualified,
continues to act as judge of the court. The leading case in this state to
this effect is State ex rel. Renfro v. Wear."' Respondent Wear, a circuit
judge, by an order of court had disqualified himself from sitting as judge
89a. Burke v. McClure (1922) 245 S. W. 62, 211 Mo. App. 446.
89b. Carter v. Bolster (1906) 122 Mo. App. 135, 98 S. W. 105.
90. State ex rel. Norborne Land Co. v. Hughes (1922) 240 S. W. 802, 294 Mo. 1.
Elder, J., writing the opinion, said: 1. c. 805. "The real question before us is one of
venue. If the circuit court ot Ray County lacks jurisdiction, or is assuming authority
in excess of its jurisdiction, prohibition will lie."
91. (1895) 129 Mo. 619, 31 S. W. 608. Judge Gantt, delivering the opinion,
said: "When the request was made by Judge Wear as authorized by the constitution
and statute, and that request unquestionably included the cause of the State of
Missouri against Charles E. Wear, and was acceded to by Judge Riley, by appearing
at the time and place mentioned in the request, and formally accepting the call, all
the facts concurred which invested the latter with the powers and duties of the circuit
judgeship of that circuit for the trial of the cause of the State of Missouri against
Charles E. Wear. Ex parte Clay, 98 Mo. 578; State v. Higgerson, 110 Mo. 213; State
v. Neiderer, 94 Mo. 79. And from that moment Judge Wear, pro hac vice, became
functus officio, and had no authority or right to interfere with, or impede, the due
administration of'justice in that court, in that cause."
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in a prosecution against his son for murder. He called in Judge Riley,
judge of a nearby circuit. Judge Riley appeared at the appointed time
but Judge Wear declined to give up the bench to him but adjourned to a
later day at which time a special judge was elected. The prosecuting
attorney then petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition.
It was held by the court en banc, Judge Gantt writing the opinion,
that a writ of prohibition should issue forbidding Judge Wear and G. A.
Standard from acting as judge and special judge, respectively. It was
held that the constitution provided that if the regular judge should be
disqualified the court might be held by the judge of any circuit in that
state. It was pointed out that the legislature by statute had provideL
that near kinship to a defendant in a criminal prosecutic.n disqualified a
circuit judge. The original order calling in Judge Riley was held to be
valid and proper and when he appeared Judge Wear had no jurisdiction
in the case.
The principle of this case has been applied to other cases when for
some legal reason the circuit judge has not been qualified to sit in the
pending case. 92
92. State ex rel. Lentz v. Fort (1903) 178 Mo. 518, 77 S. W. 741; State ex rel.
Judah v. Fort (1908) 210 Mo. 512, 109 S. W. 737; State ex rel. McAlhister v. Slate (1919)
278 Mo. 570, 214 S. W. 85. In the last case Faris, J., writing the op nion, said: "Upon
the question whether prohibition is the proper remedy, the case of State ex rel. v.
Wear, 129 Mo. 619, is upon principle conclusive. This is so apparent as scarcely to
require exposition. The ultimate facts in the Wear case were that Judge Wear, being
concededly related to the defendant, and therefore biased and prejudiced as the
legislature had determined, by the very fact that it passed the stitute disqualifying
him and others similarly situated, yet persisted in sitting the trial of the case, or in
preventing another judge from taking jurisdiction therein. If the fact of the bias o1
Judge Wear had not been foreclosed by the legislative determination of the fact of
prejudice from the fact of relationship, but had been left to be determined by evidence
adduced, it is as plain as a pikestaff that the cases presented ire precisely alike.
Therefore, it the fact of respondent's prejudice and bias shall have been shown by the
evidence in this case, he stands in a position in no wise different from that of Judge
Wear, and so prohibition will lie.
"Therefore, if we shall find as a matter of fact from the evideace in the case that
respondent is prejudiced, we bring the case as we look at it, preci,ely within the pro-
cedure successfully invoked in the Wear case. How stands the evidence upon this
question of fact?"
See also State ex rel. Kochtitzky v. Riley (1907) 203 Mo. 175, 101 S. W. 567.
State ex rel. Brady v. Evans (1904) 184 Mo. 632, 83 S. W. 447, seems to be contra,
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(e) Where Jurisdiction of The Case Has Previously Been Assumed by
Another Court in The Judicial System.
It would seem to be true that if in our judicial system suit has been
begun in a court with jurisdiction, and the jurisdiction of the court has
attached, that a second court should be stopped from entertaining
jurisdiction of that suit.
There are a number of cases where substantially that situation has
been presented, and the rule seems established that the writ should issue
to stop all action in the second court, that attempts to exercise judicial
powers.13 For instance in an equity case where the holders of certain
holding it is mere error for a judge not to vacate the bench. In that case Valliant, J.,
said 1. c. 642: "If the application is in due form and in due time, his duty to grant
the change in a certain class of cases, is imperative, but still it is for him, at least, to
say that the application is or is not in due form or in due time, and although he may
err in his judgment yet his jurisdiction is not thereby ended. And sometimes the
application is complicated with other questions. Take this case for illustration:
does the statute in relation to change of venue in ordinary civil suits apply to a con-
tested election case? That that is a debatable question is shown in the briefs before
us in which learned counsel on each side have debated it both on principle and on
authority; the learned circuit judge himself took time to consider it and postponed his
decision to a later day. If the application for a change of venue was a jurisdictional
fact, the very filing of it ended the jurisdiction of the court, regardless of the opinion
the judge may have had of the law questions involved, and all the duty that remained
to him was to designate another court or judge to try the case."
See State ex rel. Bixman v. Denton (1908) 128 Mo. App. 304, 107 S. W. 446.
There a court of appeals decided that a circuit judge was not qualified, and, that the
party-one who had been granted a dramshop license by the county court-was
entitled to have another judge called in to try the case. The court, though, denied his
petition for a writ of prohibition but very oddly, it seems, ordered the circuit judge to
call in another judge.
93. Roper v. Cody (1877) 4 Mo. App. 592; State ex rel. Missouri etc. Lumber Co.
v. Dearing (1904) 180 Mo. 53, 79 S. W. 454; State ex rel. Sullivan v. Reynolds (1908)
209 Mo. 161, 107 S. W. 487; State ex rel. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Williams (1909)
221 Mo. 227, 120 S. W. 740; State ex rel. BowlingGreen Trust Co. v. Barnett (1912) 245
Mo. 99, 149 S. W. 311; State ex rel. Federal Lead Company v. Dearing (1912) 244 Mo.
25, 148 S. W. 618; State ex rel. Jgenbohs v. Landis (1913) 173 Mo. App. 198, 158 S. W.
883; State ex rel. Davis v. Ellison (1919) 276 Mo. 642, 208 S. W. 439; State ex rel.
Mitchellv. Gideon (1922) (Mo. App.) 237 S. W. 220.
State ex rel. Richardson v. Withrow (1897) 141 Mo. 69, 41 S. W. 980, where the
writ was issued stopping a circuit court from proceeding with an assignment for the
benefit of creditors where it was made by a surviving partner who at the time was
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notes were enjoined from suing at law, and an appeal was taken, but the
chancellor continued the injunction pending the appeal, a writ of pro-
hibition was issued stopping another circuit court from proceeding in a
suit on the notes.
94
So, also, where a circuit court had appointed a receiver and the
defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, a circuit coart of another
circuit was prevented by prohibition from proceeding with a suit to
appoint a receiver for the same defendant. 5
The rule has been applied to cases when a suit has been begun in the
state court after jurisdiction of a Federal Court over the same case has
already attached. 96
acting as administrator of the partnership affairs under the jurisdict on of the probate
court.
94. State ex rel. Missouri Pine Lumber Co. v. Dearing (1904) 180 Mo. 53, 79 S.
W. 454. The opinion consists mainly of a consideration of the power of the court to
continue the injunction pending the appeal. There is practically no discussion as to
the propriety of prohibition.
95. State ex rel. Sullivan v. Reynolds (1908) 209 Mo. 161, 107 3. W. 487. Wood-
son, J., writing the opinion, said: "Whenever the jurisdiction of a court of competent
authority takes jurisdiction of a case that fact must of necessity and in the very
nature of things exclude the jurisdiction of all other courts over the same case, as
well as all the incidents thereto, excepting only such courts as are given appellate and
supervising control over them. The reason for this rule seems to be that when such a
court takes jurisdiction of a particular case, with all the incidents thereto, there re-
mains nothing of it to which the jurisdiction of another court can attach-no case,
no parties, no subject-matter is left exposed to the authority of the litter court."
"If the condition of things that exists in this matter is permitted or tolerated,
there would be an inevitable conflict between the two courts and the officers of each
in the service and execution of their respective orders and processes. This would not
only interfere with the orderly and speedy administration of the lw, but might lead
to physical conflicts between those officers in their efforts to obey those orders and
judgments. The result would lead to confusion, chaos and anarchy within the very
temples of justice, and sanctioned by the highest tribunal of the State. Such a condi-
tion should not be tolerated."
96. State ex rel. Federal Lead Co. v. Dearing (1912) 244 Mo. 25, 148 S. W. 618;
State ex rel. Bowling Green Trust Co. v. Barnett (1912) 245 Mo. 99, 149 S. W. 311;
State ex rel. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Williams (1909) 221 Mo. 227, 120 S. W. 740.
The following extract from the separate concurring opinion of Lamm, J., in State ex
rel. Mo. Par. Ry. Co. v. Williams, supra, puts the question interestingly: "Is juris-.
diction a mere matter of power or caprice? If the Federal court assume it in the first
instance (as here) may the state court take it away directly if it has the might? Or
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(f) No Jurisdiction Because an Appeal Has Been Taken to a Higher
Court.
After an appeal has been taken a lower court loses jurisdiction of
the cause. 7 There are several cases in Missouri holding that prohibition
will lie to stop further action by the lower court after an appeal has
properly been taken to a higher court.9 8 In State ex rel Laclede Bank v.
Lewis,"5 the St. Louis Court of Appeals was about to issue a peremptory
writ of mandamus to a judge of the circuit court ordering him to enter a
judgment on a verdict that had been rendered in a case that had been
tried in the circuit court. The circuit judge appealed from the order of
the court of appeals to the Supreme Court, and gave a supersedeas bond.
Notwithstanding the appeal, and the bond, the court of appeals
was about to issue a peremptory writ of mandamus. At this juncture
the defendant in the original civil suit filed a petition for prohibition in
the Supreme Court. The latter court issued the writ basing its decision
upon the ground that after the appeal and bond the court of appeals no
longer had jurisdiction; holding from that time on, jurisdiction of the
cause was in the Supreme Court.' The writ was also issued when a
circumscribe it, baffle it or whittle it away by ingenious indirection? Or may two
courts proceed on contrary theories at the selfsame time and grind a litigant between
the upper and nether mill stones of jurisdiction? The one saying aye and the other
nay and each speaking an imperative voice?
"In the old days on the border Rob Roy and his clan had a property notion
based on power alone. Of them it was said that:
"The good old rule
Sufficeth them-the simple plan,
That they should take who have the power,
And they should keep who can."
"Such 'simple plan' has no place in jurisprudence when applied to jurisdiction.
So, what a State court may not seize with power, directly, it may not take in a round-
about way by 'inching' over on the edges, or getting the sameresult by indirection."
97. Ladd, Patrick Co. v. Couzins (1865) 35 Mo. 513; Burgess v. O'Donoghue
(1886) 90 Mo. 299, 2 S. W. 303.
98. State ex rel. Laclede Bank v. Lewis (1882) 76 Mo. 370; State ex rel. St. Louis
etc. Ry. Co. v. Hirzel (1897) 137 Mo. 435, 38 S. W. 961; Cuendet v. Henderson (1902)
166 Mo. 657, 66 S. W. 1079; State ex rel. United Rys. Corp. v. Wiethaupt (1911) 238
Mo. 155, 142 S. W. 323.
99. (1882) 76 Mo. 370.
100. Ray, J., writing the opinion, said: "It may be remarked in the first place,
that in this proceeding no question can arise as to the propriety of the ruling of the
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circuit court had appointed a receiver, upon a creditor's bill, for a corpo-
ration, and the corporation gave bond and appealed to the Supreme
Court from the order of the circuit court, declining to sei: aside the order
appointing the receiver.10' So, also, a probate court was stopped by
prohibition from enforcing its order that an administrai-or turn over all
the assets of a decedent's estate to an administrator de bonis non, where
the administrator had appealed to the circuit court, and given bond,
from an order of the probate court removing him.102 The decision was,
based upon the ground that when the appeal was allowed, and the bond
given, the probate court lost all jurisdiction.
(g) No Jurisdiction Because the Term of Court Has Expired.
Similar in principle to the cases just mentioned are cases where a
final judgment has been rendered in a lower court and the term at which
the judgment was rendered has expired. After the expiration of the
term the court no longer has jurisdiction and hence may be stopped by
prohibition from taking further action." 3 Hence the Supreme Court
issued prohibition to stop a special judge of the circuit court from grant-
ing a new trial, and conducting the same, where there had been a criminal
prosecution for murder and defendant had been convicted, and had filed
a motion for a new trial, which had been overruled, and the term at
which the motion was overruled had expired. The Supreme Court held
circuit court on the motion for a new trial; or that of the court of appeals in awarding
said mandamus, as it is a fundamental principle that the writ of :prohibition is never
allowed to usurp the functions of an appeal, writ of error or certiorari. High on
Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 771, 772.
"The only question now before us is the power of the court of appeals to order the
mandamus, notwithstanding the appeal and approval of the bond in question. If the
plain language of the statute is to control, it seems to us that the court of appeals,
after the granting of said appeal, and the approval of said bond, had no further
jurisdiction of the cause, and no power whatever to order the issaance of said writ."
101. State ex rel. St. Louis etc. Ry. Co. v. Hirzel (1897) 137 Mo. 435, 38 S. W.
961.
102. Cuendet v. Henderson (1902) 166 Mo. 657, 66 S. W. 107).
103. State ex rel. Brown v. Walls (1892) 113 Mo. 230, 20 S. NV. 1047; State ex rel.
Lentz v. Fort (1903) 178 Mo. 518, 77 S. W. 741; State ex rel. Bond v. Fisher (1910) 230
Mo. 325, 130 S. W. 35; State ex rel. Verble v. Haupt (1914) 181 Me. App. 18, 163 S. W.
532; State ex rel. Gardiner v. Wurdeman (1915) 192 Mo. App. (057, 179 S. W. 964;
State ex rel. Orr v. Latshaw (1922) 291 Mo. 592,237 S. W. 770.
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that after the term expired at which the motion for a new trial was over-
ruled the court no longer had jurisdiction over the case and was powerless
to grant a new trial."'
(h) No Jurisdiction in an Inferior Court Because the Case Has Already
Been Finally Decided by a Supreme Court.
There are several cases where the rule seems to be approved that
if a cause has been finally decided by a superior court an inferior court
will be stopped by writ of prohibition from proceeding contrary to the
mandate of the higher court." 5
(i) Amnesty
After an amnesty has been granted by the state a writ of prohibition
will issue to prevent a lower court from trying persons who have received
the benefits of the amnesty. A circuit judge was therefore stopped from
trying some 1200 misdemeanor charges against a brewing company for
violating a beer inspection law, when after the inspection law was passed
the legislature passed an act granting a pardon to all persons who within
a certain time paid a certain sum of money into the state treasury and
the brewing company had paid the sum the state required.'
104. State ex rel. Brown v. Walls (1892) 113 Mo. 42, 20 S. W. 883. See also
State ex rel. Gardiner v. Wurdeman (1915) 192 Mo. App. 657, 179 S. W. 964.
105. Nolte v. Ferris (1920) (Mo. App.) 226 S. W. 293; State ex rel. Tune v.
Falkenhainer (1921) 288 Mo. 20, 231 S. W. 257.
106. Nolte v. Ferris (1920) (Mo. App.) 226 S. W. 293.
107. State ex rel. v. Eby (1902) 170 Mo. 497, 71 S. W. 52. Sherwood, J., writing
the opinion, said: "The 'Beer Compromise Act' being an act of general amnesty,
enacted by the Legislature in favor of the class to which relators belong, there was no
manner of necessity for relators to plead it in bar of the prosecution in the lower court,
since they could not have waived it if they would. And that act being a public law, the
respondent judge was bound to take notice of it, and could not ignore it if he would.
"And yet, notwithstanding the con-tract made by relators with the state in
pursuance of an express law enacted for the purpose; notwithstanding a solemn con-
tract made, a consideration paid and accepted, and legislative amnesty granted, the
respondent judge places himself on this record as intending to try relators on the very
charges which the act, on compliance with its terms, s'ays shall be barred. We do not
hesitate to say that such intended course of conduct is indubitably beyond the
jurisdiction of the trial court, and such fact is made apparent on the face of this pro-
ceeding."
UNIVERSITY ()F MISSOURI BULLETIN
(j) An Unconstitutional Statute.
In the case last considered, State ex rel. v. Eby, l"" . decision by the
court, en banc, three of the judges out of the seven composing the
Supreme Court were of the opinion that the beer inspection law was
unconstitutional and hence, they concluded that as the law was void,
because contrary to the constitution, the circuit court had no jurisdic-
tion, and prohibition for this additional reason should issue to stop all
further action in the circuit court. A court of appeals after the decisions
of State ex rel. v. Eby, supra, was urged to hold prohibition would lie
from circuit court to a police court to stop a prosecution in the latter
under an ordinance relating to chimneys, which was claimed to be unrea-
sonable and void. The court of appeals, however, declined to issue the
writ taking the view that appeal was an adequate remedy.10 9
108. (1902) 170 Mo. 497, 71 S, W. 52. As to this Sherwood, J., said: "And it
has been determined that if any given law is unconstitutional, thi., of itself will afford
ground for relief by prohibition. (Ex parte Roundtree, 51 Ala. 42; State ex rel. v.
Young, 29 Minn. 474; 19 Am. and Eng. Encyc. of Law (1 ed.) 270, and cases cited.)
"Of course, if the law is unconstitutional which is made the basis ot the proceed-
ings, the case is one where it is obvious on the face of such proceedings that the trial
court had no jurisdiction, and prohibition will consequently lie." A majority of the
court in State ex rel. v. Wood (1900) 155 Mo. 425, 56 S. W. 474, decided prior to State
ex rel. v. Eby, supra, were of the opinion that a court of equity did not acquire juris-
diction upon allegations in a petition, to restrain the collection of a personal tax, that
the law imposing the tax was unconstitutional where no additional grounds for issuing
the injunction were alleged. Prohibition was issued stopping the trial of the suit for an
injunction. Gantt, C. J., 1. c. 452, said: "The result of our exv.mination is that the
petition in the circuit court did not and in the very nature of the case could not, under
the Act of May 4, 1899, allege facts which brought the case under any recognized
head of equity jurisprudence. The case stands upon the naked averment that the law
is unconstitutional and the inspection fee illegal, the remaining averments wholly
failing to make a case under any decision of this court for injunct:ve relief."
109. State ex rel. v. Shannon (1908) 130 Mo. App. 90, 108 S. W. 1097. Goode,
J., writing the opinion, said: "It is true that in exceptional irstances the writ will
issue to prevent a court from proceeding with a cause of action, criminal or civil,
arising under an unconstitutional statute or a void city ordinance. In State ex rel. v.
Eby, 170 Mo. 479, 71 S. W. 52, the Supreme Court prohibited a circuit court from
proceeding with a cause founded on an unconstitutional statut.-. But this was done
to'prevent a multiplicity of suits which would have been instituted and maintained
on the void statute if prohibition had not been granted, an exceptional fact. So, it
seems, injunction will lie to prevent numerous prosecutions urder a void municipal
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(k) Equity Suits. Injunctions.
The reports contain many instances where prohibition has been
sought to stop a circuit court, which has general equity powers,"'
from proceeding further in the pending case. Most of the cases where
the writ has been applied for, are cases where plaintiff in the lower court
is asking for an injunction or a receivership. The cases where an injunc-
tion is the remedy asked will be considered first. It cannot be said that
entire harmony of statement, and perhaps decision, obtains in these cases,
though it would seem that substantially the cases are harmonious and
that a fairly well defined general rule may be deduced. Perhaps again at
the outset of this branch of the subject, and before a generalization is
made, it would be well to examine in some detail a few of the early cases
on the question. The first case presenting this problem is Thomas v.
Mead, et al."' already mentioned. Holmes, J., as stated, wrote the opin-
ordinance. (Sylvester Coal Co. v. St. Louis, 130 Mo. 323, 32 S. W. 649). And there
are authorities authorizing prohibition as well in such cases; or at least suggesting it
will lie. (23 Am. & Eng. Cyc. Law (2 ed.) 230). Those decisions given in the footnote
in the work just cited, which discussed prohibition as a remedy against prosecutions
under an invalid municipal ordinance, while they did not deny the occasional expedi-
ency of the remedy, refused it in the instances dealt with, because there were more
appropriate remedies by appeal'or writ of error, for testing the validity of the
ordinances."
110. Fitt v. Owens, et al. (1868) 42 Mo. 512; State ex rel. Merriam v. Ross, Judge
(1894) 122 Mo. 435, 25 S. W. 947; State ex rel. Hofmann v. Scarritt, Judge (1895) 128
Mo. 331, 30 S. W. 1026; Arnold v. Henry (1900) 155 Mo. 48, 55 S. W. 1089; State ex
rel. McCaffery v. Aloe (1899) 152 Mo. 466, 54 S. W. 494; State ex rel. Kenmore v. Wood
(1900) 155 Mo. 425, 56 S. W. 474; State ex rel. American Lead etc. Co. v. Dearing, et
al. (1904) 184 Mo. 647, 84 S. W. 21; State ex rel. Abel v. Gates (1905) 190 Mo. 540,
89 S. W. 881; State ex rel. Fenn, Relator, v. Riley, et al. (1907) 127 Mo. App. 469, 105
S. W. 696; State ex rel. Missouri Pacific Ry. Co. v. Williams (1909) 221 Mo. 227,
120 S. W. 740; State ex rel. Minnesota etc. Co. v. Denton (1910) 229 Mo. 187, 129 S. W.
709; Stateex rel. BowlingGreen Trust Co. v. Barnett (1912) 245 Mo. 99, 149 S. W. 311;
State ex rel. Penn v. Mc~uillin (1914) 256 Mo. 693, 165 S. W. 713; State ex rel. Warde
v. Mcuillin (1914) 262 Mo. 256, 171 S. W. 72; State ex rel. Elam v. Henson (1919)
217 S. W. 17; State ex rel. Allen v. Dawson (1920) 224 S. W. 824; State ex rel. Priest v.
Calhoun (1920) (Mo. App.) 226 S. W. 329; State ex rel. Mills v. Calhoun (1921) 234 S.
W. 855; State ex rel. Methudy v. Killoren (1921) 229 S. W. 1097 (App.); State ex
rel. Youngman v. Calhoun (1921) 231 S. W. 647; State ex rel. Berncie v. Huck (1922)
246 S. W. 303 (Mo.); State ex rel. Burns o. Shain (1923) 248 S. W. 591 (Mo.); State ex
rel. Chase v. Hall (1923) 250 S. W. 64 (Mo.).
111. (1865)36Mo. 232.
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ion. Holmes, J., wrote many of the early prohibition opinions for the
court. His opinions are brief, clear, and display a sound knowledge of the
scope and purpose of the writ.
It will be recalled that a circuit court in Thomas v. Mead, supra, was
stopped by prohibition from proceeding further in an equity suit to
restrain certain persons from taking possession of the bocks, records, etc.
of the Supreme Court. The court soundly decided t.iat though the
circuit court had general equity powers it had no jurisdiction whatsoever
to decide who was entitled to the records of the Supreme Court, especial-
ly since the pending case finally would turn on who were the de jure
judges of the Supreme Court. Holmes, J., in the opinion, said: "There
was not the shadow of an equity in the petition, properly considered, on
which to ground an injunction at all. It is unnecessary :o deny that, in
certain cases, an injunction may be granted, mainly on t:he ground that
an immediate and irreparable injury is threatened to be done, for which
otherwise there would be no adequate and complete redress; and if a
stranger, without right or authority, were unlawfully interfering with
the rightful possession by the clerk of the records, books and papers of
his office (especially if the court itself were not in sess.ion), it is very
probable that such a case might arise as would give the circuit court
jurisdiction to interpose by injunction against such person. But plainly
on the face of this petition, this was no such case, but only a transparent
pretence of such a case. It cannot justly be considered otherwise than
as a sheer abuse of the process of injunction."
The extract quoted may be said to fairly indicate the rule as it has
been stated and applied in many of the later equity cases. If the petition
in the suit for an injunction states facts which show that a court of equity
has no power to issue an injunction, prohibition will issue as that case
does not belong to the class of cases of which the court has jurisdiction.
The petition may be considered to determine whether plaintiff is entitled
to equitable relief. If the facts as pleaded, and as they can be well
pleaded, if they are defectively pleaded, show that plaintiff is not entitled
to an injunction the court of equity will be stopped by th2 superior court
by a writ of prohibition.
The next case of this nature that came before the Supreme Court is
Vitt v. Owens,"' decided in 1868. Again the opinion was written by Hol-
112. (1868)42Mo. 512.
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mes, J. The facts in that case were as follows: The justices of the county
-court of Franklin County had taken action towards submitting to the
voters the question of removing the county seat. In the meantime the
,court began certain repairs on the county court house. Certain citizens
and taxpayers of the county brought a suit for an injunction, in the cir-
cuit court of Franklin County, to restrain the justices from making furth-
er repairs. A temporary injunction was granted. The justices then filed,
in the Supreme Court, an application for a writ of prohibition to stop the
circuit court from further action.
It was held a writ of prohibition should issue; that the matter of
repairing the court house was exclusively for the county court and the
circuit court had no power to interfere. Holmes, J., writing the opinion,
said: "It is sufficient to say that here was no proper case even for this
remedy, and much less for the remedy by injunction. Moreover, there
was no equity in the petition on which an injunction could properly be
granted. The facts stated made no case that would come under any head
of equity jurisdiction for relief. The plaintiffs therein had no greater
interest in the matter than any other taxpayers. No injury was done to
them, no irreparable damage threatened, in respect of their property or
private rights. It was simply a matter affecting the public interest and
convenience, and one which the law had submitted to the judgment and
discretion of the county court. Whether that discretion was properly
exercised or not, the facts stated in the petition afforded no basis what-
ever for equitable relief in favor of the plaintiffs, by injunction or other-
wise, against the county court or any other parties defendant. In such
case the granting of an injunction can only be regarded as a sheer
usurpation, or an inadvertent assumption of judicial power not conferred
by any law; and the proceeding must be treated here, and for all the
purposes of this application, as a nullity. It was not merely a trans-
gression of the bounds of the proper jurisdiction of the court, or judge,
but an exercise of judicial authority where no jurisdiction existed; and
there can be no question but that we are fully warranted by the authori-
ties in granting a prohibition. (Thomas v. Mead, 36 Mo. 232)"
Those decisions are followed by many cases on the subject. The
problem has not always been easily solved and the distinction not always
easy to make between cases where the bill in equity states no ground for
equitable relief by injunction, and could not be amended to state proper
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grounds, and cases where equity has power to issue an injunction, in
cases of the same general type, as stated in the pending petition, but
the petition is a defective statement of the case, one that could be
amended so as to state a good cause for equitable reliei'. In cases of the
latter type prohibition will not issue. A good examp.e of cases of the
latter type is State ex rel. Abel v. Gates,"' decided in 1905, Valliant, J.,
writing the opinion. There a suit in equity was commenced in a circuit
court to restrain members of the city council, and cerl:ain private indi-
viduals, from passing an ordinance relating to the privilege of using the
streets for gas mains, selling gas, etc. It was contended by relator, who
petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition, that the petition
did not state a cause of action. The Supreme Court declined to issue the
writ saying that a court of equity had power to restrain members of the
city council from passing an ordinance relating to such administrative
matters, when the proposed ordinance involved a corrupt bargain, or
had the effect of relinquishing valuable contract rights previously ob-
tained by the city for its inhabitants, and, that the writ would not be
granted where the petition merely defectively stated a cause of action.
Valliant, J., for the court said: "So, here, if the statements of fact are
not sufficient to constitute fraud, the trial court will sc decide, and there
will be time enough for us to express our opinion on that question when
it comes before us on appeal. If the case stated, or attempted to be
stated, in the petition, is of a subject over which the c.rcuit court has no
jurisdiction, yet the court gives indication of a purpose to entertain it,
an application for a writ of prohibition would be received, but if it be
that the petition merely states defectively a cause of the nature of which
the court has jurisdiction, a writ of prohibition wit. not issue merely
because it is feared that the court might erroneously decide that it was
sufficient. We do not mean to imply from what is here said that the
statements aiming to charge fraud in this petition are not sufficient or
that they are of the same character as those in the Nagel case; we have
no opinion on that subject, because the time for us 1o form an opinion
has not arrived."
Those three cases, it is believed, bring out the rules that guide the
courts in determining whether to issue or not to issue the writ. If from
the petition it is evident no cause of action is, or can be, stated justifying
113. (1905) 190 Mo. 540,89 S. W. 881.
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an injunction, and the court is about to issue one, the writ of prohibition
will issue. If from the petition it appears that the matter has been
defectively, or not fully, stated and the petition may be so amended as
to state grounds for relief by injunction the writ of prohibition will not
issue.
The following are instances where it was decided that the petition
did not state grounds for injunction relief, and could not be amended so
as to state proper grounds, and hence a writ of prohibition should be
issued. A circuit court was stopped by writ of prohibition from proceed-
ing further in an equity suit to restrain certain persons from taking
possession of property of a city used in connection with elections. It was
alleged the election law under which defendants were acting was uncon-
stitutional. 4 The decision was put upon the grounds that the purpose of
the bill was either to try title to office, a matter over which a court of
equity had no jurisdicition, or, perhaps, to protect the political right of
the voters, another matter over which the court of equity had no juris-
diction. There are several later cases also holding that prohibition will
issue to stop a circuit court from entertaining jurisdiction of a bill in
equity when the purpose of the bill is to try title to office or protect
political rights."'
114. State ex rel. McCaffery v. Aloe (1899) 152 Mo. 466, 54 S. W. 494. Valliant,
J., said: "The real and only purpose of the suit in the circuit court was to bar the
entrance to the office of board of election commissioners by injunction, and to obtain
a decree of a chancery court declaring relators' title to the office invalid. That is a
subject over which a chancery court has no jurisdiction. The courts of law are open
to all persons who have rights of that nature which have been violated, and ample
means are afforded in those courts for the vindication of such rights and redress of
their wrongs. (High on Inj., sec. 312; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200; Hunter v. Chandler,
45 Mo. 452; State ex rel. v. Vail, 53 Mo. 97; State ex rel. v. May, 106 Mo. 488)."
"There is no disguise of purpose in that statement; the powers of the chancery
court are there plainly invoked to protect by injunction purely political rights. No
such jurisdiction has ever been conceded to a chancery court, either in the Federal or
State judiciary. The political rights of a citizen are as sacred as are his rights to
personal liberty and property, but he must go into a court of law for them." Accord,
State ex rel. McCaffery v. Eggers (1899) 152 Mo. 485, 54 S. W. 498.
115. Arnold v. Henry (1900) 155 Mo. 48, 55 S. W. 1089, in accord. Here Gantt,
C. J., said: "In a word it is an attempt by a proceeding in equity to try the title to a
political office, and we hold that equity has no such jurisdiction; that the courts of
law furnish ample remedies for such a purpose, and we must decline in this proceeding
to determine the validity of Washburn's title to the position." State ex rel. Allen v.
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The writ was issued stopping a circuit court from i:rying a suit in
equity, the purpose of which was to have the court declare certain
priorities for railroad stocks and bonds, and to declare a certain mortgage
a junior lien. It was decided the petition did not state a cause of action
and could not be the basis of a decree as the property was beyond the
jurisdiction and several of the essential parties not within the court's
jurisdiction."' The writ was issued to prevent a circuit :ourt from pro-
ceeding further with a bill in equity instituted by the circuit attorney of
St. Louis to restrain the railroads of Missouri from charging more than
the statutory rates for carrying passengers in the state. There were
several grounds for the decision, one of which was the cirzuit attorney of
St. Louis, in his official capacity, could not institute a suit for the people
of the state and hence the petition showed on its face no basis for the
exercise of the equity jurisdiction of the circuit court.", The writ was
issued stopping a circuit court from proceeding further in a suit in equity
to restrain the Beer Inspector from inspecting beer and instituting
Dawson (1920) (Mo.) 224 S. W. 824, where Williams, J., said: "The facts alleged, or
attempted to be alleged, in the petition in the injunction suit, disclose the violation
of no right other than a purely political one, and, since no facts are alleged which
invoke any of the different grounds of equity jurisdiction, it clearly follows under the
numerous authorities above cited that the circuit court in the case at bar is without
jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief prayed."
116. State ex rel. Bowling Green Trust Co. v. Barnett (1912) 245 Mo. 99, 149 S.
W. 311. Graves, J., writing the opinion, said: "The question then is, what is the
character of this suit? Conceding it to be an action to cancel certain debenture bonds
held in New York under a trust agreement to be performed in New York, as I think
we must, then what? To my mind it is clear our circuit courts are without juris-
diction. The property is not here, neither are the principal parties in interest within
the jurisdiction of the court. Can a Missouri circuit court decree the cancellation of
bonds held in New York which bonds are held by a trust agreement to be performed
in New York? We think not. Can such court cancel these bonds when upon the face
of the petition many parties interested therein are not before the court even by
publication or substituted service? We think not. If the property were here the
question would be different. But the property sought to be reached is in New York
and the most of the parties interested are there, or at least not ill Missouri. In such
case service by publication or other substituted service will not ,Lvail. The property
not being here no jurisdiction of the person can be obtained by 3ervice of this char-
acter."
117. State ex rel. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Williams (1909) 221 Mo. 227, 120 S. W.
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criminal prosecutions, when it was alleged the beer inspection law was
void because contrary to the constitution. It was held courts of equity
had no power to enjoin criminal prosecutions provided for in the
inspection law, and that the inspection, though void, if carried out would
not deprive those making beer of their property without due process of
law."' Prohibition, however, was denied, to stop a circuit court from
entertainingjurisdiction of a bill in equity brought by certain commission
merchants to restrain certain officials from prosecuting under an act
known as the state marketing bureau act, where it was alleged the act
was unconstitutional, that property rights were involved, that enforce-
ment of the law would destroy business, injure and destroy property,
etc." 9 The court distinguished State ex rel. v. Wood, supra, saying it was
not shown in that case that irreparable injury to property or business
would result from an enforcement of the beer inspection law.
118. State ex rel. Kenamore v. Wood (1900) 155 Mo. 425, 56 S. W. 474. Gantt,
C. J., writing the opinion, said: 1. c. 453-4. "Having examined the various allegations
of the bill for injunction in our opinion it did not state a case which fell within the
class of which the circuit court had jurisdiction to grant an injunction, for the reason
that the alleged unconstitutionality of the law alone furnishes no ground for injunc-
tion; and because the circuit court had no jurisdiction to prevent the institution of
criminal proceedings by the inspector by information to punish violations of said act,
and because in our opinion the bill, otherwise, charges no traversable facts showing
a want of an adequate remedy at law, but on the contrary shows that the courts of
law are open to the plaintiffs in said case to make their defense to any prosecution
under said act, and that the act of May 4, 1899, does not require an inspector to open
sealed packages of beer after they are closed to inspect the same, but may inspect
said beer or malt liquors before put in the closed barrels or bottles.
"For these reasons we think the provisional rule of prohibition should be made
absolute against Judge Wood and the circuit court over which he presides, but as
Judge Ferris took no part in the case it is ordered dismissed as to him."
119. State ex rel. Chase v. Hall (1923) (Mo.) 250 S. W. 64. David E. Blair,
writing the opinion, said: "In this case, as in the Merchants' Exchange Case, the
plaintiffs allege in their petition (and in this proceeding the facts well pleaded therein
must be treated as true) that their businesses as commission merchants, built up by
years of effort, will be ruined, either if they attempt to comply with the marketing
bureau act and take the required license, or if they test the validity of the law by
submitting to criminal prosecutions wherein numerous fines will be assessed and
numerous appeals necessary. They will be ruined by the enforcement of the alleged
unconstitutional law, whether they obey it or resist it in the ordinary course of standing
trial and appealing from convictions. Their business is an entirely legal business and
very important to the producers and consumers of farm products. Their established
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A circuit court was also stopped from trying a suit in equity to
restrain a litigant in a pending suit from taking depositions, on the
ground that the petition in the suit, in which the depositions were to be
taken, did not state a cause of action. 2 ° The decision was placed upon
the ground that depositions could be taken, under the statute, though
the petition did not state a cause of action. A circuit court was also
stopped from proceeding further with a suit in equity to restrain a
physician from treating persons living within a certain district, when the
petition showed only a contract with another physician, not to establish
businesses represent property rights which will be seriously impaired if not altogether
wrecked by the enforcement of the law before its validity can be determined in the
ordinary course through convictions and appeals. As in the Merchants' Exchange
case, plaintiffs' situation calls for relief which only the strong arm of the court of
equity affords. If the law is valid, it can be determined in one action. If it is invalid,
it should be speedily determined. The petition alleges that defendants threaten to
enforce the penalties of said law and cause defendants to be repeatedly arrested and
prosecuted. It must be assumed that relators intend to do so. St.ch course of action
will require defendants to take appeals in all cases of conviction, resulting in great
labor and expense in furnishing appeal bonds and in paying for bills of exceptions and
in printing of abstracts and briefs and fees and expenses of counsel, Such prosecutions
will tend to impair the confidence of their customers, and thus tend to destroy the
business of such commission men."
See Merchants Exchange v. Knott (1908) 212 Mo. 616, 111 S. W. 565. Lamm, J.,
writing the opinion, said: "But the charge of irreparable injury is sufficient to sustain
the jurisdiction of a court of equity. The objection made to the charging part of the
bill in regard to irreparable injury, is, in substance, that the pleading is a mere bundle
of conclusions, and that no traversable allegations are made upon which issue can be
joined and upon which irreparable injury can be predicated, bui: we do not agree to
that. Plaintiffs allege that their business (describing it) of grain weighing and cer-
tification, a valuable asset and property right in grain dealing, built up (they say)
and nurtured for many years by them, is about to be struck down and ruined and
their grain markets ruined in ways pointed out by the enforcement of an unconstitu-
tional law. The thing threatened to be done directly pertains to property rights which
the bill alleges plaintiffs have acquired. Certainly, it could not b contended that the
business of grain dealing, grain weight and grain certification by grain dealers, ware-
hbusemen, and elevators is per se an illegal business. Conceding it is under the State's
police power, yet that police power must be exercised through a valid law.. Now, an
unconstitutional law is the same as no law at all; and, on demurrer, we must assume
the allegations of the petition relating to irreparable injury in the way specified are true.
This being so, we conclude the bill states a cause of action, and nothing said in State
ex rel. v. Wood, supra, when rightly understood, militates against that conclusion."
120. State ex rel. Methudy v. Killoren (1921) (Mo. App.) 299 S. W. 1097.
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF PROHIBITION
an office within the district, 2' so the higher court thought. It seems
doubtful whether the action of the lower court, in interpreting the con-
tract, conceding the interpretation was erroneous, and granting an
injunction, made a situation that deprived it of jurisdiction. It would
seem that at most it was only an error in the exercise of jurisdiction not
correctible by prohibition.
The rule seems settled that if the subject matter of the petition in
the equity suit for an injunction is one ordinarily within the powers of a
court of equity, though the petition may be demurrable, that prohibition
will not be issued. Hence, the writ was denied to stop a circuit court
from entertaining jurisdiction of a suit by trustees of a local lodge to
restrain the supreme lodge and others from depriving plaintiffs of the
use of their property, and from appropriating the funds, etc.' It was
held the circuit court had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the ac-
tion, and all the parties, and that the sufficiency of the petition would not
be determined. Also; a petition for the writ was denied to stop a circuit
court from entertaining further jurisdiction of a suit in equity to restrain
121. State ex rel. Youngman v. Calhoun (1921) (Mo. App.) 231 S. W. 647.
Becker, J., writing the opinion, said: "In the light of this view it is clear that the
decree entered below by the learned circuit judge, in so far as it restrains and enjoins
Dr. Youngman, in his practice of medicine and surgery, from making calls within said
prescribed district, or treating patients living within said district, or from treating
former patients or residents of such district who might call at his office, even though
it is established outside the said district, goes beyond the terms of said contract,
and is therefore to that extent in excess of the jurisdiction of the said learned trial
judge, respondent here."
122. State ex rel. Warde v. McZuillin (1914) 262 Mo. 256, 171 S. W. 72. Lamm,
J., writing the opinion said: "As to that we say: The sufficiency of the petition was
not challenged by demurrer below. The court, so far as we can see, made no ruling
on its sufficiency.* How it might rule in due course is hidden in the womb of the future,
and is discoverable only by the event, barring the occult vision of a seer, which latter
we utterly disavow as a judicial attribute. It has been held in some cases, on the
facts present in those cases, that if the sufficiency of the petition has been challenged
in the circuit court and ruled adversely to demurrant so that it was settled once for all
that the trial court entertained an erroneous view in excess of its jurisdiction and was
going to put it in force, the remedy by prohibition might be invoked. But, on such
facts as we are now dealing with, there is a better doctrine applicable to this extraordi-
nary remedy, one finding abundant place in our decisions, to the effect that the circuit
court does not lose jurisdiction by mere error in ruling on a demurrer or otherwise
when such error is correctible on appeal or writ of error."
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defendant from selling liquor."3 A temporary injunction had been grant-
ed which was quite broad in its terms and apparently restrained defend-
ant from operating the store mentioned in the petition. Graves, Elder,
Blair, (J. T.), JJ., dissented on the ground the temporary order was too
broad, that a court of equity could not temporarily restrain the operation
of the store mentioned in the petition, viz, a grocery store, according to
the applicable statute2 4 relating to temporary injunctions in this partic-
ular type of nuisance. Some time later another attempt to secure a writ"
of prohibition failed when the pending case was an injunction proceeding
to restrain certain persons from using a building in which it was alleged
liquor was illegally sold,' where it was claimed the petition for the in-
junction did not state a cause of action. So, also, it has been held the
writ will be denied to prevent a circuit court from proceeding further in
a suit in equity to restrain a multiplicity of suits at law on the ground
that the petition in the equity case failed to state the cause of action. 2 '
123. State ex rel. v. Huck (1922) (Mo.) 246 S. W. 303. Higbee, J., writing th e
majority opinion stated that "the petition for injunction does not locate or identify
any alleged grocery store, or allege that violations of the liquor law are being com-
mitted at any grocery store, etc., located or identified. The sufficiency of the plead-
ings, and whether the order made is too broad, are questions which should, in the first
instance, be addressed to the circuit court, and are matters for correction there upon
proper application."
Graves, J., writing the dissenting opinion, used this language: "The point is that
under the temporary order the use of the house for lawful purposes cannot be re-
strained. This temporary order, as appears by the excerpt in the majority opinion,
shows that the defendant was restrained from running 'the pool room, dry bar or
soft drink counter and store mentioned in said petition'. The store mentioned in the
petition was a 'grocery store'. Then follows the injunction against the liquor business.
This latter part of the order is good. No one denies that the lawmakers can and have
made the manufacture and sale of liquors unlawful, and provide both civil and crimi-
nal proceedings to meet the situation. But here we have a part of the temporary re-
straining order covering things that all citizens have the legal right to do."
See also State ex rel. Thrash v. Lamb (1911) (Mo.) 141 S. W. 655.
124. Laws of 1921, p. 4 1 3 et seq. Section 6594 C.
125. State ex rel. Burns v. Shain (1923) (Mo.) 248 S. W. 591.
126. State ex rel. Fenn. v. Riley (1907) 127 Mo. App. 469, 105 S. W. 696. Goode,
J., writing the opinion, said: "It is within the jurisdiction of equity, on a proper show-
ing in the proper forum, to prevent by injunction a multiplicity of suits, and a court of
equity could not properly be prohibited from hearing a cause which applied for in-
junctive relief against such a grievance. Nor would it be sufficient to authorize
prohibition that there is no merit in the suit for injunction, or that the petition for
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT OF PROHIBITION
The writ was denied to stop a circuit court from proceeding further in an
injunction suit begun by the attorney general to restrain a club from
illegally registering bets on horse races under color of a license fraudu-
lently obtained from the state. 6a It was held the court of equity had
jurisdiction to so protect the interest of the state in its grant of the licens-
es.
(I) Equity Suits. Receiverships.
A study of the cases where prohibition has been prayed to stop a
court from proceeding further in an equity suit, when a receiver is asked
for, will show that the rules stated and applied are in substance the same
as in the injunction cases just considered. Perhaps the leading case on
this branch of the subject is State ex rel. Merriam v. Ross.'27 In that case
the writ was issued by the Supreme Court to a court of common pleas
stopping further action in a receivership case. It was held that a petition
for a receiver filed by a debtor corporation stated no grounds whatsoever
said writ is demurrable. Those would be matters for the attention of the court of
first instance, subject to review by the court of last resort, and would not go to the
jurisdiction of the subject matter of the cause."
In this case the writ was issued on the ground that the particular equity court
had no jurisdiction as the statute required that a suit in equity to restrain the prosecu-
tion of suits at law must be brought in the county where the law suits are pending,
and this equity suit was not so brought. As to this point, Goode, J., said: "It will be
perceived that the temporary writ granted by the judge of the probate court in the
injunction suit, enjoined the defendants from doing two things, namely, instituting
more cases against Conran and prosecuting in any manner Fenn's slander suit in
the circuit court of the City of St. Louis, until the final determination of Conran's
case against Fenn in the Supreme Court. Now, to our minds, it is perfectly clear that
in the second part of this order the Honorable Judge of the probate court, who in this
instance wielded temporarily the authority of a circuit judge, acted in excess of the
jurisdiction of the circuit court. The effect of the writ granted is to prevent.the prose-
cution in any manner of a case pending in the circuit court of the City of St. Louis,
an independent jurisdiction. Our statutes provide that proceedings for an injunction
to stay a suit or judgment, shall be had in the county where the judgment was render-
ed or the suit is pending. (R. S. 1899, sec. 3631). This section of the statutes has been
construed to mean that when the main relief prayed is an injunction to restrain the
prosecution of a suit, the remedy must be sought in the jurisdiction where the action
or suit to be enjoined is pending."
126a. State ex rel. Delmar Jockey Club v. Zachritz (1901) 166 Mo. 307, 65 S. W.
999.
127. (1894) 122 Mo. 435, 25 S. W. 947.
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for the appointment of a receiver, and that the common pleas court
should be prohibited from carrying out its order relating to the receiver-
ship. The following extract from the opinion of Brace, J., who delivered
the opinion of the court en banc, indicates the basis of the court's decision.
"In other words, it is simply a petition by a debtor for the appoint-
ment of a receiver to manage dnd carry on its business, so that its
creditors cannot enforce their legal rights in the courts of the country,
and not a petition stating a cause of action either at law or in equity in
which, as incident thereto, a receiver might be appointed. The filing of
that petition no more instituted an actual controversy between contend-
ing suitors in court, than would the filing of a copy of the Lord's Prayer.
It laid no foundation whatever for the exercise of the jurisdiction of
the court to appoint a receiver, unless some ground for the exercise of
that jurisdiction can be found other than an actual, pending controversy
in the court which undertook its exercise."
Barclay, J., wrote a dissenting opinion, in which Gantt and Burgess,
JJ., concurred. The dissenting opinion is placed upon the ground that
the common pleas court had general equity powers and that the petition
for the receivership did state a cause of action.
In the next case of this type that came before the Supreme Court,
prohibition was denied as the court was of the opinion that the petition
stated a cause of action, warranting the appointment of a receiver;'
and, that as the parties were properly before the court no jurisdictional
question was involved.
Later it was held the writ would issue to stop a circuit court from
proceeding further in a suit for a receiver begun by an employee who was
128. State ex rel. Hofmann v. Scarritt (1895) 128 Mo. 331, 30 S. W. 1026. This
case was decided by Division No. 1 of the Supreme Court, Barclay, J., writing the
opinion. As to State ex rel. v. Ross(1894) 122 Mo. 435, 25 S. W. 947, supra, he said:
"The relator has cited and relied upon some rulings in State ex rel. v. Ross
(1894) 122 Mo. 435, 25 S. W. Rep. 947 to sustain his contention on this branch
of the case. But some of us did not concur in that judgment, and the rest of our
number consider that the facts shown in the present proceeding distinguish the latter
from the case discussed and decided in the opinion referred to; so that we all agree that
the decision in the Ross case does not support the relator's claim for the writ of
prohibition now."
See also State ex rel. American Bankers etc. Co. v. Mc.Z-uillin (1914) 260 Mo. 164,
168 S. W. 924.
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neither a stockholder nor a creditor. 129 So, also, the writ was issued
stopping a circuit court, in an equity case, from attempting to carry out
its orders appointing a receiver for a foreign corporation where the court,
through the receiver, attempted to control a guarantee fund of the foreign
company, which fund was outside the state and the jurisdiction of the
,court.3 ° A court of appeals, following the principles laid down by the
Supreme Court, issued its writ of prohibition to a circuit court stopping
all further action in a receivership suit where it was determined the
petition for the receivership stated no cause of action in equity, and was
not amendable.' 3'
129. State ex rel. American Lead Co. v. Dearing (1904) 184 Mo. 647, 84 S. W. 21.
130. State ex rel. Minnesota El. Co. v. Denton (1910) 229 Mo. 187, 129 S. W. 709.
Valliant, J., writing the opinion for the court en bane said: "In this case the plaintiff
claims to hold three policies of $2000 each, not mature, nothing now due on them,
yet he asks that to protect his interests a receiver be appointed to go to Minnesota and
take possession of the $600,000 guarantee fund, to preserve it for the security of his
claims and the like claims of all others who will join him in this suit. No such receiver
would be or ought to be recognized at the home of the corporation.
"The circuit court has no jurisdiction of the cause of action stated in the petition
of Herman P. Faris v. The Minnesota Mutual Life Insurance Company, and no
amendment of the petition could give the court jurisdiction of that cause; an amend-
ment stating a cause of action within such jursidiction would be an amendment
stating a new or different cause of action; the demurrer should therefore have been
sustained and the case dismissed."
131. State ex rel. Priest v. Calhoun (1920) (Mo. App.) 226 S. W. 329. See also
State ex rel. Calhoun v. Reynolds (1921) (Mo.) 233 S. W. 483, where it was held upon
certiorari that the judgment of the court of appeals would not be quashed. The
entire opinion was devoted to a discussion of the question whether the petition for
the receivership stated a cause of action. It was held it did not. There was no dis-
cussion of the propriety of prohibition where the petition does not state a cause of
action and is not amendable. To the same effect is State ex rel. Mills v. Calhoun (1921)
(Mo. App.) 234 S. W. 855. Daues, J., writing the opinion, said: "The best we can
make out of the petition is the charge that the defendants, individually and for the
corporation entered into certain contracts with the plaintiffs which, it is said, were
broken. The allegations of the petition as to mismanagment, viewing the petition
in the most favorable light for the plaintiffs, is no more than a charge of dissatisfac-
tion and would not justify the appointment of a receiver. The decree rendered by the
court is extremely latitudinous. Among other things, the court declared that the
plaintiffs were entitled to the status of stockholders, which is outside of the relief
prayed for in the petition, and which finding really precludes the appointment of a
receiver in this case. The court, as said above, found that defendants were all of the
stockholders in the corporation at the time the contract was alleged to have been
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Prohibition was denied by the Supreme Court where the writ was
asked immediately after a circuit court had issued an order to show cause
why a receiver should not be appointed, and before the date on which
cause was to be shown, and no demurrer had been filed to the petition. 1t
So, also, the writ was denied where, in an equity suit involving title to
land, a circuit court had appointed a receiver to hold and manage the
land pending an appeal. 33
(m) Election Contests.
Though an election contest is not a "suit" or a "case" within the
usual meaning of those terms, it has been held to be a judicial matter,
summary in its nature, and authorized by the constitution to determine
title to office.13 1
Under the statute the contest is begun by a formal "notice" which
serves the purpose of bringing the contestee into court and advising him
'of the grounds of the contest. Prohibition has been issued to stop a
made; but the court does not find that the corporation was insolvent, nor that the
corporation was threatened by a mechanic's lien (which is alleged), or other loss of its
holdings. If the finding of the court be correct that the corporation was without
treasury stock, and that the defendants owned all of the stock, then the corporation
never was in a position to carry out the terms of said alleged agreement. All of this
appears from the face of the petition itself."
132. State ex rel. Fenn v. Mc~uillin (1914) 256 Mo. 693, 165 S. W. 713. Faris,
J., writing the opinion said: "This order to show cause on August 20, 1913, why
a receiver should not be appointed, was made on August 18, 1913; notice of said order
was in the meantime sought to be given to relators (or to some of them), but on
August 19, 1913, the day between these dates, before the day of showing cause came
around and before the court was ever advised as to whether the notice to show cause
was served upon relators or any of them, the writ herein was sued out. Manifestly,
we cannot forecast what action would have been taken by the learned court, nisi.
We must presume that he knew the law and that he would follow it. He was not
given the chance here to demonstrate the one fact or to perform the other. He had the
authority in a proper case to appoint a receiver in vacation (Sec. 2018 R. S. 1909),
and in cases of crying need to so appoint without notice (Tuttle v. Blow, 176 Mo. 1. c.
171): certainly he can so appoint for such a period as will suffice for the appearance
of the adverse party And the making of a showing of cause against the continuation
of such receivership. (State ex rel. v. Wear, 135 Mo. 230.)"
133. State ex rel. Elam v. Henson (1919) (Mo.) 217 S. W. 17. See also State ex
rel. Allen v. Guthrie (1912) 245 Mo. 144, 149 S. W. 305.
134. State ex rel. Wells v. Hough (1906) 193 Mo. 615, 91 S. W. 905.
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circuit court from proceeding further when the notice states no facts,
warranting a trial, and is unamendable;"' or, has not been given the
length of time required by law. 136 On the other hand, if the notice is
given the length of time required by law and facts are stated, or are de-
fectively stated but amendable, which if proven would give the office to
the contestant, prohibition will not issue to correct mere error in the trial
of the matter. 17
(n) Other Extraordinary Writs.
There also is a decided tendency towards the view that if an inferior
court is about to issue an extraordinary writ, improperly, that a superior
court will prevent it from being done by its extraordinary writ of pro-
hibition. The view seems to be that if the facts in the petition or applica-
tion show affirmatively that no cause exists for issuance of the extra-
ordinary writ, then the inferior court has no jurisdiction over that class
of cases. About the same view prevails that has been referred to in the
equity cases previously discussed. The Supreme Court, for instance,
issued prohibition to a court of appeals stopping the latter court from
proceeding further with a writ of prohibition issued to a probate court
to stop further action by the probate court in a proceeding to adjudge
one incompetent to manage his affairs.1371 a It was held the only question
involved in the insanity proceeding was whether the person alleged to be
insane lived in St. Louis or St. Louis County and that this was a question
of fact exclusively for the probate court. So the writ was issued by the
Supreme Court to a circuit court preventing the latter court from pro-
135. State ex rel. Funkhouser v. Spencer (1901) 166 Mo. 271, 65 S. W. 981.
136. State ex rel. Hancock v. Spencer (1901) 166 Mo. 279, 65 S. W. 984. But
see State ex rel. Brown v. Klein (1893) 116 Mo. 259, 22 S. W. 693.
137. State ex rel. Sale v. McElhinney (1906) 199 Mo. 67, 97 S. W. 159; State ex
rel. Wells v. Hough (1900) 193 Mo. 615,91 S. W. 905.
137a. State ex rel. Johnston v. Caulfield (1912) 245 Mo. 676, 150 S. W. 1047.
Graves, J., writing the opinion, said: "The information on file in Judge Shackel-
ford's court charged that the alleged insane person was within the jurisdiction of his
court. Whether he was in such jurisdiction was a question of fact to be determined by
the probate court upon a proper hearing. Prohibition will not lie to stop the judge
of probate from determining the question of fact as to his jurisdiction. By their writ
respondents are seeking to do this, and in so doing are exceeding their authority and
powers."
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ceeding further with a petition for prohibition that was pending in the
circuit court to stop members of a city council, city attorney, etc., from
trying a city marshall on charges that had been preferred against him
by the mayor. 1 1b It was held the circuit court had no jurisdiction as the
petition for prohibition on which it was about to act showed that
prohibition was asked to stop mere administrative action, and not usur-
pation of judicial power. The writ was issued stopping a circuit court
from proceeding in mandamus to compel a circuit attorney to institute
a quo warranto action against one who claimed he was duly elected a
member of a city legislative body. la c It was held the circuit attorney had
the power'of exercising his discretion whether he would institute quo
warranto and that mandamus would not issue to control the discretion
of an officer. A writ of prohibition was issued stopping a circuit court
from further entertaining jurisdiction of a preliminary writ of prohibition
the circuit court had issued to excise commissioners who had issued an
order to a dramshop keeper to show cause why his dramshop license
should not be revoked.1?1d The hearing as to whether the dram shop
137b. State ex rel. McEutee v. Bright (1909) 224 Mo. 514, 123 S. W. 1057.
Graves, J., writing the opinion, said: "Nor will it do to say that because the respon-
dent Bright is the judge of a court of general jurisdiction and such court can issue
writs of that kind, that therefore this court cannot prohibit him for further proceeding
in this case. A writ of prohibition from this court is proper, not only in cases where the
lower tribunal has no legal authority to act at all, but also in cases wherein such in-
ferior tribunal, although having general jurisdiction over a particular class of cases,
has exceeded such jurisdiction in the particular case."
It would seem from this extract that the court regarded this as an instance of an
excess of jurisdiction rather than a case of no jurisdiction. As it was held the circuit
court could not issue the writ, it would seem as if this is a case of no jurisdiction and
not a case where the circuit court had merely exceeded its power in this particular
case.
137c. State ex rel. Folk ;. Talty (1902) 166 Mo. 529, 66 S. W.'361. Burgess, J.,
writing the opinion, said: "There is nothing, however, disclosed by the record in this
case, which justified the issuance of the writ of mandamus against the circuit attorney
by the defendant, Talty, upon that or any other ground.
"Our conclusion is that it was not within the power or jurisdiction of Judge
Talty as judge of the circuit court of the City of St. Louis to compel Circuit Attorney
Folk, to exhibit a writ in the nature of a quo warrano at the relation of defendant
Buechner against Buckley to require him to show by what authority he claimed to
hold the office of a member of the House of Delegates of the City of St. Louis."
137d. Higgins v. Talty (1900) 157 Mo. 280, 57 S. W. 724. Burgess, J., writing
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license should be revoked was not a judicial matter. A circuit court was
also stopped by the Supreme Court from going further with a mandamus
case to compel a county court to approve a sale of land to pay a dece-
dent's debts,a 7e it being held that the kind of order to be made was for
the county court to first decide. The opinion in this case was written by
Currier,J., and is based upon the proposition that the circuit court had
no jurisdiction of the alleged cause of action stated in the petition for
mandamus. In the same year and at the same term of the Supreme Court
another case was decided which seems to be contra.1"7t No mention is
made in either opinion of the decision of the other case. In the case last
referred to, the Supreme Court denied a petition for the writ on the
ground that the circuit court though it had improperly issued manda-
mus to a county court, had only committed an error in the exercise of its
jurisdiction. It seems that a circuit court issued a preliminary writ
the opinion said: "Our conclusion is that the circuit court of the City of St. Louis had
no jurisdiction whatever over the case, and that the writ of prohibition should be
awarded as prayed. The costs of this proceeding are adjudged against the defendant
Joseph Roselli."
The view of the court in this case evidently was that there was no jurisdiction
in the circuit court and not an instance of excess of jurisdiction.
137e. Trainer et al. v. Porter (1870) 45 Mo. 336. Currier, J., said: "It is urged,
however, that the circuit court acquired jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the
mandamus suit pending before it, and that this court ought not, therefore, to inquire
into the manner in which that jurisdiction is being exercised. This proposition con-
tains an erroneous assumption. The court, by its process, acquired jurisdiction of the
party, but not of the cause of action, towit: the action of the court in disapproving
the administrator's sale. That was the gravamen of the complaint and the circuit
court, as we have seen, had no jurisdiction of it whatever."
137f. Wilson v. Berkstresser (1870) 45 Mo. 283. Bliss, J., writing the opinion,
but not mentioning Trainer v. Porter (1870) 45 Mo. 336, supra, said: "If it had such
jurisdiction, it does not matter, so far as this case is concerned, whether it has been
lawfully or erroneously exercised. The county court has the sole right of saying
whether a road shall be opened, changed, or vacated, and the circuit court cannot
control its discretion in the matter. If a new road is to be opened, it has also the
right of saying whether the damages, if any, shall be paid by the petitioners or
by the county. If the court decides that the petitioners shall pay them, it
ought not to order the road to be opened until the money is deposited. If it deter-
mine that the county shall pay them, the appropriation should be made before
the road is opened. The county has clearly no right to open the road until one or the
other is done. But, in either case, if the money is deposited by the petitioners, or if
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of mandamus to a county court ordering it to allow B the sum of eighty-
five dollars damages for changing a road and to draw a warrant for the
same. It was said by the Supreme Court that issuance by the circuit
court of the preliminary writ of mandamus was error as the award of the
damages was not made upon a proper petition to change the road and
also the damages were improperly assessed at a term subsequent to the
term at which they should have been assessed. Bliss, J., writing the
opinion, said 1. c. page 851: "But no such continuance was had, and the
eighty-five dollars verdict is coram nonjudice
the court decides that the county shall pay the damages assessed, it becomes its
clear ministerial duty to issue a warrant upon the treasury for the amount; and if the
court refuses to issue such warrant, it should be compelled to do so by mandamus. It
follows, then, that circuit courts have jursidiction by mandamus, in the matter of
payment of damages assessed to the person through whose land a road passes, and,
in a proper case, may lawfully issue the writ. Such jurisdiction being conceded, it
clearly follows that a writ of prohibition will not issue to prevent its erroneous exer-
cise. Some other remedy must be resorted to."
(To Be Continued)
